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Abstract
Dual trading reduces total trading volume and market depth, but
has no effect on price efficiency. Trading volume and gross (of
commission fees) profits of the informed traders are lower with dual
trading while trading volume and gross losses of the uninformed traders
are unaffected. This effect of the ban on the uninformed is the same
irrespective of whether they act as noise traders or as rational, risk-
averse hedgers.
Commission fees charged by the broker may increase with dual
trading if the probability of a trade occurring decreases, the broker's
fixed costs are large and dual trading profits are small. The utility
of the uninformed traders (net of commission fees) will increase with
dual trading when their expected commission costs are relatively lower
and the gross profits of all other traders also increase. The net
profits of the informed traders will be lower with dual trading if the
probability of an informed trade increases less relative to the
probability of an uninformed trade and the relative commission costs of
the uninformed traders are lower.

Dual trading refers to the practice of brokers trading for their
own accounts in addition to bringing their customers' orders to the
market. The practice has, over the years, been controversial with
proponents of dual trading vouching for its salutary effects on market
liquidity and price efficiency and opponents emphasizing the potential
conflicts of interest between dual trading brokers and their customers.
On the regulatory front, the anti-dual-trading camp currently holds
sway. In March 1993, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
proposed limiting dual trading in the largest futures markets. The
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) banned dual trading in all active
contracts effective May 20, 1991. But, the issue is by no means
settled, as the Exchange still faces great resentment over the ban.
I develop a model to study how a ban on dual trading will affect
aggregate market characteristics (total trading volume, market depth and
price efficiency) . I also study its distributional effects by looking
at the impact on brokers' commission fees as well as the trading volumes
and profits (both gross and net of commission fees) of the informed and
the uninformed traders. The main conclusions are that dual trading
reduces total trading volume and market depth without affecting price
efficiency. Ignoring commission fees, informed traders are hurt with
dual trading while uninformed traders neither gain nor lose. With
commission fees, which group benefits depends upon how dual trading
affects the probability of an informed trade relative to an uninformed
trade and whether relative commission costs increase or decrease with
dual trading.
The microstructure of the basic model follows Kyle (1985).
Uninformed noise traders^ and a group of m informed traders submit
market orders to a broker who places them (along with her own orders)
with a marketmaker for execution. The marketmaker batches the total
order flow and executes them at a single price. The price is determined
by assuming that the marketmaker makes zero profits conditional on
observing the total order flow.
The broker's motive for dual trading comes from her private
observations of the size of her customers' orders.-^ In equilibrium,
she is able to infer all of her informed customers' information from her
observations and profit through mimicking or piggybacking on the
informed trades. Because their orders are now executed at a higher (in
absolute value) price, the broker's piggybacking hurts the informed
traders, who react by restricting their order sizes. Thus, informed
trading volume is higher when dual trading is banned.
The broker also offsets a portion of uninformed trading volume.
This decreases total trading volume and market depth when there is dual
trading. However, because volume and depth decrease in the same
proportion, price informativeness and the price level are unaffected by
dual trading. It follows that the profits of the informed (ignoring
commission fees) are lower with dual trading. Finally, total informed
trading (i.e., informed plus dual trading^) profits are identical
across markets and, therefore, so are the losses of the noise traders.
These results are unchanged when the basic model is extended to
allow for rational behavior by uninformed traders. Following Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992), uninformed traders (who are risk-averse) trade
in order to "hedge" their endowments of shares of the risky asset.
Since both market depth and net uninformed trading volume (of the
uninformed traders and the broker) are lower in the same proportion, the
price impact of an uninformed trade and the variance of uninformed
trading profits and, therefore, the expected utilities of uninformed
traders are unchanged by dual trading.
Next, I analyze trading behavior when investors have to pay
commission fees to the broker whenever they place an order. The
commission fees are assumed to be fixed (i.e., independent of the order
size). As in Fishman and Longstaff (1992), the broker incurs fixed and
variable costs of brokerage. Further, the brokerage business is
competitive so that the broker's total income (trading profits plus
commission income) is zero. The effect of these commission fees is to
make some previously feasible trades unprofitable. Then, a ban on dual
trading may actually reduce commission fees if the probability of a
customer trade thereby increases and dual trading profits are small.
However, if dual trading reduces the probability of a customer trade the
expected commission costs of all traders will also be lower with dual
trading.
Ignoring commission fees, informed gross profits are lower and
expected utilities of the uninformed are the same with dual trading.
With commission fees, informed profits improve with dual trading if the
uninformed pay relatively higher commission costs with dual trading and
the probability of their trading decrease relative to that of the
informed traders. Uninformed traders benefit with dual trading if the
gross profits of all other traders to increase as well and, further, if
their relative commission costs are lower.
Roell (1990) has a model of dual trading in which a broker
observes the trade of some uninformed traders. Her model does not
include the effect of commission fees. Informed traders have higher
profits when dual trading is banned. Uninformed traders whose trades
are observed by the broker have higher profits with dual trading. Those
whose trades are not observed by the broker are hurt by dual trading.
In Fishman and Longstaff (1992), the broker has private
information about whether her customer is informed or uninformed.
Before commissions, all customers lose with dual trading. Including
commission fees, dual trading benefits the uninformed traders and hurts
the informed traders. In contrast to this paper, they assume that
trading volume is fixed at one unit. As a result, the informed trader
in their model fails to take into account the broker's mimicking
behavior when formulating her optimal trading strategy. A further
implication of this assumption is that the broker's commission fees are
always lower with dual trading. They also do not model the behavior of
the customer when she is uninformed. On the other hand, they allow the
customer and the dual trader to trade at different prices and they also
model the effect of frontrunning by the broker.
Chang and Locke (1992) find no positive correlation between the
order imbalances of dual traders and customers in the currency futures
market. They conclude that piggybacking behavior by dual traders is
absent. However, since no distinction is made between informed and
uninformed customer trades, the lack of a positive correlation is not
conclusive. Another interesting result is that dual traders do not, on
average, make more profits on their personal trades relative to locals
(who are not privy to any information regarding customer identity or
trade size). Studies also find that restricting dual trading either has
little effect on bid-ask spreads (Chang and Locke (1992), CFTC (1989))
or depth (Park and Sarkar (1992)) or leads to a decrease in the realized
spread (Smith and Whaley (1990), Walsh and Dinehart (1991)). Further,
Park and Sarkar (1992) find that a restriction on dual trading in the
S&P 500 futures market decreased total trading volume by about 4.59%.
The empirical results, therefore, suggest that dual trading has no
strong positive or negative market impact
—
perhaps because it is not an
important provider of liquidity in many Chicago futures markets (as
suggested by Chang and Locke ( 1992 ) )
.
Sections I and II develop the basic dual trading model with noise
traders, ignoring commission fees and compares it to a model where dual
trading is completely banned. Results on the market impact of dual
trading are obtained. Section III extends the model to allow for
rational behavior by uninformed traders. Section IV introduces the
effect of fixed commission fees on the informed and uninformed traders'
optimal trading strategies. Then, the effect of dual trading on
commission fees and traders' net profits is explored in Section V. The
study concludes in Section VI. All proofs are contained in the
appendix.
I. THE DUAL TRADING MODEL AND SOLUTION
A. The Dual Trading Model
I consider a market in which a single risky asset with unknown
liquidation value v is traded. There is a group of m informed traders
each of whom receive, prior to trading, signals s' about the unknown
value V. The signals are of the form s' = v + e\ i=l,...,m where the
error terms e^ are independent of each other. In addition, there is a
group of uninformed noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons.
Initially, the uninformed traders' motives for trading are not modelled.
Later, the basic model is extended to allow for rational behavior by the
uninformed traders.
Each informed trader i = l,...,m submits a market order x, to a
d
broker. The noise traders also collectively submit market orders worth
u to the same broker. The latter then places the total of the submitted
m
orders (x.+u), where x^ = J^x^, to a marketmaker for execution.* In
i-l
the dual trading model, the broker may also trade an amount d for her
own account. She may want to do so because, by observing the market
orders x of the informed, she is able to infer some or all of their
d
information s'. In addition, it may be profitable for the broker to
take the opposite position of the group of uninformed traders. The act
of dual trading makes the broker both a de facto informed trader as well
as an uninformed trader. At this stage, I ignore commission fees
(which are introduced in Section IV)
.
It is assumed that, when the broker places her customers' order
with the marketmaker, she simultaneously sends along her own order d as
well. The marketmaker then fixes a single price p. at which she will
execute the total order flow y^ = x. + d + u. Following Kyle (1985),
the marketmaker is assumed to be risk-neutral and competitive.
Conditional on observing y ., she earns zero expected profits.
The random variables in the model are v, u and e\ i=l,... ,m. All
these variables are normally distributed with zero mean and finite
variances S^, S^ and E^, respectively. Thus the m error terms are drawn
o
from an identical distribution. ° In addition, all investors follow
linear trading rules x. = A.s\ i=l,...,m (for the informed) and
d ^
d = B^x, + BpU (for the broker). This implies that the marketmaker '
s
pricing rule is also linear: PH(yH) = ^d^d' ^^®^® ^/^d ^^ ^^®
now-familiar market depth parameter.
There are three distinct stages to this trading game:
(1) Informed traders receive their information and decide how much
they want to trade. In making this decision, each informed trader is
aware that, first, she is in competition with the other informed traders
and, second, that the broker will "piggyback" on the information
conveyed by her trading decision. The informed traders care about the
broker's piggybacking because they receive a less favorable price for
their trades as a consequence. Noise traders simply submit u.
(2) The broker observes u and x and infers that each informed
d
trader has some information s' , i=l,...,m. Based on her inferences
and u, she decides to trade an amount d.
(3) The marketmaker fixes a price p. = r.(x.+u+d), where
Pd = E(v|y^) and so r^ = Cov(v,yj) /Var (y^) .
This suggests the following solution method. Fix r. and suppose
that each informed trader i=l,... ,m has decided to trade some amount x
d
and uninformed traders have submitted demand u. From each x the broker
d
infers information s' . She then chooses d to maximize her expected
profits, where the expectation is taken with respect to the vector
(s ,..., s"'*,u) . Each informed trader i then chooses x^ as a best response
d
to d(s^ ,... , s"'*,u) , the rival informed traders' decisions x
, j # i and
d
8uninformed trades u. Finally, r^ is obtained from the optimal trading
rules and the marketmaker ' s zero profit assumption.
Depending upon what the equilibrium beliefs of the broker are,
there can be potentially many equilibria to the signalling game between
the informed traders and the broker. Fortunately, in this model, the
signalling game affords a unique solution: there is a single fully
separating equilibrium. In other words, she informed traders'
information is fully revealed to the broker and so in equilibrium
s = s , j.=l,...,m.
B. The Dual Trading Solution
First, I solve the signalling gcune between the informed traders
and the broker. Given her observations of x^ and u, the broker
chooses d to maximize her conditional expected profits given by
E(7r| s^*,..., s'"*,u) , where n = (v-T^Y^)d, From the first-order condition,
the optimal d = [E(v| s^*,..., s""*) - T^{x^+u) ] /2T^. The second-order
condition is satisfied by r^ > 0. Define t = 2^/(2^+2^) and note that
0<t<l. tisa measure of the unconditional precision of s',
i=l,...,m. For example, if t=l then s' is a perfect signal. Then
m
E(v|s^*,...,s"'*) = ts*/Q where Q = [l+t(m-l)] and s* = J^^^*' Therefore,
i=l
the broker's optimal trade is:
d=-^-i^l^. (1)
2Qr. 2
In a separating equilibrium s' = s' = x /A . for each i=l,... ,m. So,
the presence of the dual trader is seen to have two opposite effects on
an informed trader's incentive to trade. Suppose x^ > (a buy order).
If Xj is increased, the broker infers that the informed traders'
information is improved and so s is higher as well. The broker trades
more, d is higher and so is the resulting price. Thus, this signalling
effect tends to inhibit informed traders from trading aggressively.
On the other hand, a higher x^ also reduces d from the second term
in (1). This is a "second-mover disadvantage" for the broker as she has
to accommodate market orders of any size by the informed and tends to
encourage informed trades. For finite m, however, the signalling effect
always dominates the second-mover effect, so that B^ > in equilibrium
(x^ and d always have the same sign). The broker optimally mimics the
trading decisions of the informed. Also, the broker optimally takes the
opposite position of the aggregate uninformed trades.
Given (1), each informed trader i chooses x to maximize her
d
conditional expected profits E(I |s'), where
V - r^d - r^Xd " r^i^ x^ - r^u x^ . After incorporating the optimal
V 3*1
value of d from equation (1) into I , the first-order condition for x ,
d d
i * j is:
^Al^f^ =r,[x,^.0.5(m-l)E(xi|sM] ^ ^. (2)
Equation (2) says that the marginal value of an additional trade
for the i-th informed trader is equal to its marginal cost. This cost
has two components: the change in the price due to her own and her
rivals' expected trades plus the change in the broker's inference as to
her information. After using the facts that (i) s' = s' = x /A^ in
10
equilibrium and (ii) E(s-'|s') = ts' for j ^^ i, A^ is obtained as the
coefficient of s' in (2):
''''
r,Q(Q.i) • ^^^
From (3), A. = when m = 1. But A^ = cannot be a separating
equilibrium since the functions x = A^s', i=l,...,m are then no longer
invert ible.
Lemma 1: When m = 1, there is no solution to the dual trading model.
The result can be interpreted as follows. The inhibiting effect
of the broker's piggybacking or mimicking behavior on any individual
informed trader is inversely related to m, the number of informed
customers the broker has. For m = 1, this inhibiting effect exactly
offsets the marginal value of an extra trade for the individual informed
trader as the first-order condition (2) reduces to:
t(si-si') =r^xi. (4)
So, for any x > 0, the marginal cost of an additional trade for the
d
informed always exceeds its marginal benefits. Substituting (3) into
(1), the optimal dual trading function is given by:
d = ^^ - ii (5)
C(m-l) 2
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Finally, by using (3) and (5) in conjunction with the marketmaker ' s zero
profit assumption the optimal value of market depth is derived as:
v/mt2,
r^ = 2 V"'-:^ . (6)
Proposition 1 fully characterizes the dual trading equilibrium.
Proposition 1: If m > 1 and t > 0, there exists an unique solution to
the dual trading model in which x = A^s\ i=l,...,m, d = B^x^ - — and
p. = T^f. where A. is given by (3), B- by the coefficient of x. in (5)
and r . by (6) .
What determines the extent of dual trading in the market? Define
ab(d) = ab(B.x.-u/2) as the absolute value of dual trading volume.
Fix m, the number of informed traders. The effect of increasing the
information precision t is to make informed trades more sensitive to the
information signals and so make the broker's observations more
informative. This tends to increase ab(d). But, a higher t also
increases informed trading volume x. and this tends to reduce ab(d) via
the second-mover effect. Thus, ab(d) is increasing in t only if
t(m-l) < 1— i.e., if the total amount of information in the market is
sufficiently low. From (5), B. > 1 when t(m-l) < 1 which means that a
one share trade by an informed trader leads to a more than one share
trade by the broker in the same direction.
Corollary 1: Sign [5ab(d)/5t] = sign[B^-l] .
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Next, fit t and consider the effect of increasing the number of
informed traders m on dual trading volume ab(d) . Suppose that the
initial realizations are (s\...,s'") and the (m+l)th informed trader
observes a realization s"** from the same distribution. Now, the
broker's observation of the trade of any individual informed trader is
less valuable. But, at the same time, she observes more informed
m
trades. The net effect on ab(d) depends on the sign of s (m) =5^3^ and
the sign of s"** . If s(m) and s"^^ are of opposite signs, then ab(d)
always decreases. If they are of the same sign, then ab(d) will
increase if the additional information s"**"^ is sufficiently valuable (in
a sense made precise in the appendix).
Corollary 2: Suppose there are m informed traders with signal
realizations s ,...,3" and with given information precision t. If an
additional informed trader arrives with information realization s"^'
drawn from the original signal distribution, then the change in dual
trading volvune Ad < if s**"^ and s (m) =^s^ are of opposite signs.
Ad > if s(m) and s"**^^ are of the same sign and s"**^' is large in
magnitude
.
II. THE MARKET IMPACT OF DUAL TRADING
In weighing the costs and benefits of dual trading, a regulator
might be interested in its effect on aggregate market characteristics
(total trading volume and profits, market depth and price efficiency) as
well as its distributional effect on individual groups of market
participants. These groups include the informed and uninformed traders
and the broker. The distributional impact of dual trading may be
13
discerned by considering its effects on the trading volumes of the
informed and the uninformed, the broker's commission fees and
traders' expected profits net of commission costs. The impact of dual
trading on aggregate market characteristics is studied in this section
and the distributional question is analyzed in the following two
sections.
A. The Nondual Trading Model
I will compare the dual trading solution obtained in Section I
with the solution obtained when dual trading is completely banned. The
broker is then a pure intermediary, bringing her customers' orders to
the market. The resulting trading game is a Cournot-Nash game in
trading quantities. Each informed trader places an order x with the
broker based on her information s' . The broker submits the total order
flow y„ = x„ + u (where x„ is total informed trades in the nondual
trading market) to the marketmaker for execution. The price determined
is p = r y . Lemma 2 describes the nondual trading equilibrium.
Lemma 2: If there is no dual trading, a solution always exists provided
t > 0. The informed traders trade x = As' and the price is p^ = r^^<
where
:
n
A = t p ^ M^v (7)
"^ rji^Q)' '- (1.0) Je:"
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B. Trading Volume and Gross Profits, Market
Depth and Price Efficiency
Due to "piggybacking" by the broker, it is reasonable to expect
that x^ < x^. The difference in informed trading volume depends upon
the trading intensities A^ and A^, as well as the market depths r^ and
r^. By inspection of (6) and (7), r^^ = 2r^: relative to the market
without dual trading, market depth is half its value with dual trading.
This reflects the fact that the dual trading broker offsets half of the
uninformed trading volume. Given this result, the difference in
informed trading volume:
X. - X, =
^
(8)
which is positive for t > 0. ts/Q represents what the broker learns
about the unknown v from observing the m-vector of informed trades. The
more informative in this observation, the greater is the relative
shrinkage of informed trading volume in the dual trading market. The
difference in informed trading volume is also positively related to
market depth, since a deeper market allows the broker to trade larger
amounts with less concern about the price impact.
However, the broker herself provides an additional source of
trading activity in the dual trading market. Considering the dual
trading and informed trading activities together;
15
""^ "^ r^ 1-^0 2 ^
'
x„ = ^ -^ . ( 10
)
n
r„ i+Q
From (9) and (10), any difference in the total trading volumes
between the two markets occur because the broker offsets part of the
noise trading. Otherwise, the market depth would be equal in the two
markets and so would the total trading volumes. The broker's offsetting
of noise trades has two effects in the dual trading market: first,
total informed trading volume (by the informed traders and the broker)
is halved due to the halving of market depth and, second, net noise
trading (of the broker plus the noise traders) is halved. Hence,
y^ = 2y^: total trading volume is twice as high without dual trading.
Define price efficiency PIj, i = d,n as Z^ - var(v|p-). It can be
shown that PI^ = {r^)^'Ly,, where 2y is the variance of total trading
volume in market i = d,n. PI^- depends positively on the volatility of
total trading volume (since this depends positively on the informed
trading intensities A^ ) and inversely on market depth (since prices are
less sensitive to volume, and hence to information, in deep markets).
It follows that PI^ = PIj^ because, relative to the nondual trading
market, the reduction in the variance of total trading volume is exactly
offset by the reduction in market depth in the dual trading regime.
Let I- denote the combined unconditional expected profits of the
informed group (before observing any signals or paying any commissions)
in the i-th market, i = d,n. Since the price level p- = T-y-, it is the
Scime in the two markets. It follows that I^ < I^: gross profits of the
16
informed are strictly lower with dual trading (since the price level is
the same but informed trading volume is lower) . Total trading profits
in the dual trading market is I^ + tt, where n is the broker's trading
profits. Total informed trading profits in the dual trading market (I.
plus that part of the broker's profits obtained from mimicking informed
trades) is half of I^ (since the price level is the same but total
informed trading volume is half of x^) . But, the broker also profits
from her observance of noise trading and the amount of this profit
equals T^H^^/A or r^S^j/2, which is exactly half of I^. Thus 1^ + 17= I^.
In equilibrium, the uninformed traders as a group suffer losses
and the amount of their losses mirrors the total trading profits of the
informed traders and the broker. Denote L„ = I . - I„ + rr as the
g d n
difference in the gross losses of the uninformed traders between the
dual and nondual trading regimes. Therefore, L = 0.
Proposition 2: (1) y^ = 2y^ and F^ - 2r^. Total trading volume and
market depth in the dual trading market are half their values in the
nondual trading market. (2) PI^ = PI^ and I^ + tt = I^. Gross trading
profits and price efficiency are the same with or without dual trading.
(3) Ijj < Ip and L = 0. Gross profits of the informed are lower with
dual trading. Gross losses of the uninformed are unchanged.
In the following section, the basic model is extended to allow for
rational behavior by the uninformed traders.
17
III. HEDGING BY UNINFORMED TRADERS
There are h risk-averse uninformed traders ("hedgers") who trade
for purely risk-sharing reasons. The development of the model here
follows Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). Each hedger j has random
endowment w^ , which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance 2^. w-" , j = l,...,h are independent of each other and all
other random variables in the model. All hedgers have negative
exponential utility functions with risk-aversion parameter R.
Suppose that in market i all hedgers j = l,...,h submit market orders
u. to the broker and follow linear trading rules of the form u = D-wJ.
h
Let the total uninformed trading volume in market i be u^ = J^ Ui . If tt.
is the profit of the j-th hedger in the i-th market, then u. is chosen
to maximize her utility or certainty-equivalent profits G. = E(7r.|w-') -
p
i I
— Var (TT.
I
w-l ) . Let G-, i = d,n be the sum of the utilities of all
h hedgers in the i-th market. The informed traders and the broker's
maximization problem remains the same as before, since each w-" is
independent of v. " Market depth is now positively related to the
magnitude of the "hedge factor" D-^^ (since this increases the variance
of the total order flow) and to the risk aversion parameter R. Further,
the equilibrium Dj < since the marginal utility of the hedgers from a
purchase (sale) is negative if endowments are positive (negative).
Lemma 3 describes the equilibrium for the nondual trading market. The
appendix describes the dual trading equilibrium.
18
Lemma 3: An equilibrium to the hedger model exists if R satisfies
equation (A15) in the appendix. In equilibriiun, each hedger j=l,...,h
trades u = D^w^, where D^ < 0, market depth is l/T^/ and:
^mtSv
-or = V—
V
(11)
(i+Q)/hE;
D is defined in (A14) of the appendix.
As in Spiegel and Subrahmanyain (1992), equilibrium exists if the
amount of risk-aversion and noise in the market exceeds the amount of
information available. This is the condition specified in (A15). From
(11) and (A19) in the appendix, rjab(Dj) = 2r^ab(D^), where ab(D.)
denotes the absolute value of D- . How does dual trading affect the
choice of D-? The price impact of liquidity trades is given by T-u-.
Conjecture that r. = 2r . Then, since net liquidity trades are halved
with dual trading, the price impact of liquidity trades (including those
by the broker) is identical in both markets and so D. = D^. This in
turn means that u. = u and the initial conjecture regarding the market
depths must be correct as well.^^ As before, the price levels are
identical in the two markets and, so by implication, G. = G^. Hence,
the results about the market impact of dual trading reached in the
previous section is robust to the introduction of rational uninformed
traders.
Proposition 3: D^ = D^, G^ = G^ and r^ = 2r^. The hedgers ' trading
volumes and gross utilities are the same with or without dual trading.
The depth of the market is halved when dual trading is permitted.
19
IV. A MODEL OF TRADING WITH COMMISSION FEES
Suppose that, in market i, the broker charges a per trade
commission fee of $c- to cover her costs of brokerage. Agents make
their decisions in the following sequence. At stage zero, the broker
determines the commission fee c-. At stage one, the informed traders
observe their signal realizations and c-. Uninformed traders observe
their endowment realizations and c- . Then, both groups of traders
decide how much to trade. At stage two, if dual trading is allowed, the
broker's trade size is also contingent on c. and her observance of
informed and uninformed trades (if any). Finally, a price is set in the
manner specified earlier. Stage zero is analyzed in Section V. The
subsequent stages are analyzed here.
I will assume that the commission fees are fixed (independent of
the order size) and have to be paid whenever a trader buys or sells a
share of the asset. The optimal trading decisions are now based on
traders' profits, net of her commission fees. Further, the equilibrium
distributions of trades are likely to be truncated-normal because, for
realizations of s' and w' close to zero, net profits may be negative if
the commission fee is high. Thus, there could be a no-trade interval
around zero (the mean value of the information signals and the
endowments).^ Anticipating that this conjecture will hold true, I
will now introduce some useful results on the expectations and variances
of a random variable defined with respect to the truncated normal
distribution. ^^
20
Result 1: Let r be a random variable normally distributed with mean
and variance S^. Let [a^,a2] denote a closed interval. Define
111 = diJ^fZl and n2 = ajZ/S^. Then:
1. E(r|r < a^ and r > a^) = /SIm^ where M' = ^''J'f ~,^^^]^
v
.
<t>^ 2 V 1 + *(ni) - ^ (na)
is the normal density and * is the normal distribution.
2. Var(r|r < a, and r > a,) =sJ-(MM^ >1 * ^^^j^/^ :"''t]'''l •
[
1 +* (n^) - * (na)
J
In particular, notice that if a^ = +a and a, = -a, then n2 = +n and
n^ = -n and the two moments take the following special form:
1. E(r|r < -a and r > +a) = 0.
'
> Ej.. Further,
\_
^ \ 11/ J
v'' is increasing in n.
2. Var (rlr < -a and r > +a) = V^ = EJ 1 + "j^/ ~^}
^
*(-n)
I will first solve for the nondual trading model. Let N be the
n
profits of i-th informed trader (net of c ). Conjecture that the
ecjuilibrium trading strategy of the i-th informed trader is:
x„^ = A^s^l + AjM'^ ^ A3M" if E(NnNsM > 0.
^^2)
= otherwise.
(12) states that the equilibrium informed trades of the i-th
informed trader depends upon three variables: her own information s',
the expected trades of rival informed traders M^ and the expected
uninformed trades M". Notice that, in the model without brokerage fees,
these latter two variables were zero and so did not enter into the
equilibrium trading strategies. However, since some trades may no
longer be profitable because of the commission fees, M^ and M" can
potentially be non-zero.
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For the uninformed traders suppose Gj
. ^^ ^.,.^ ^ ^,IS the utility of the n-th
n
uninformed trader and that G is her reservation utility (i.e., her
utility when she does not trade and does not pay the commission fee)
.
Conjecture that the equilibrium trading strategy of the uninformed
trader is:
u^ = D„w^ + DjM'' + DjM^ if Gn^ > G
= otherwise,
(13)
The i-th informed trader chooses x to maximize E(N IsM, where:
n n'
Nn^ =
j»i j-l
(14)
Given the conjectures about the equilibrium trading volumes, it is
i I
*
i o
shown in the appendix that E(N js^) > requires that r^(x ) > c^.
Therefore, the no-trade interval for the i-th informed trader (computed
with respect to the trading volume x ) is given by Nn" =
n NT/ \r.
From Result 1, M^ = 0. Similarly, it is proved in the appendix that
M" = 0.
Since M^ = and m" = 0, whenever the profits of the informed
traders are positive and the utilities of the uninformed traders exceed
the reservation level, the form of the equilibrium trading strategies
are the same as in the model without commission fees. The marketmaker
sets a price whenever she observes a positive net order flow. What's
different is the market depth, which now depends on the variance of the
net order flow computed with respect to the truncated distributions of
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V S V
x_ and u„. Let V , V and V denote the variances of the random
n n n n n
variables v, s^ and w-" (with respect to their truncated distributions)
in the nondual market, as defined in Result 1.^^'^^ The following
proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 4: Suppose dual trading is banned and all traders pay a
fixed commission fee c^. Suppose also that equations (A33) and (A34) in
the appendix are satisfied. Then, in equilibrium each informed trader i
trades x = A^s^ if E(N IsM > and otherwise, where A^ is defined in
(7). Each uninformed trader trades u = Dw^ if G > G and otherwise,
n " n
where :
Dnrn = -
r"t:Vn 1 (15)
and O is defined in (A3 2) in the appendix.
Ec[uations (A33) and (A34) together ensure that D^ < in
V w
equilibrium. The reader can easily check that when E„ = V and E^ = V
* n •• n
the equilibrium of Proposition 4 specializes to that in Lemma 3 (the
case with no commission fees). The no-trade intervals for the informed
I u(T ) and uninformed traders (T ) are:
n n
T„^ = [ -an^. -a,^] where a.^ = i^ ^^ (16)
2c,
t: = [-a„^ .a„"] Where a„" =
-^ ^ -^-^^
where Z^ > in ecjuilibrium and is defined in (A29) of the appendix.
(17)
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I u
Both T and T increase in the commission fee. For the informed
n n
and uninformed traders, the direction of change is generally ambiguous.
Corollary 3 states without proof (available from the author) the likely
change in the informed traders' no-trade intervals with respect to the
number of traders m and h and the information precision t. A noteworthy
result is that the market depth may increase with the introduction of
commission fees if the volatility of the uninformed traders' endowments
increases more than the asset volatility.
u w
Corollary 3: (1) T xs increasing xn c . If V xs small it may also
u u Iincrease in m and t. If V xs large, T may xncrease in h also. (2) T
n n n
w I
is increasing in c„. If V is small, then T may xncrease xn m and
wdecrease in h. If hV is large and m is small, then it may decrease
n
in t. (3) Suppose — < -=^ . If the values of R, Z and h are high and
that of mt is low, then market depth and ab(D ) may be higher with
commission fees than without.
The analysis for the dual trading case proceeds along similar
lines. Informed and uninformed traders do not trade for some values of
their information and endowments. Equilibrium exists if either at least
two informed traders trade (see Proposition 1) or an uninformed trader
trades. The broker either offsets half of the uninformed trading volume
or piggybacks on informed trading volume or both. An interesting aspect
of this equilibrium (as well as the nondual trading solution) is that a
solution exists even when only uninformed or only informed traders
actually trade. So long as trading occurs, the forms of the trading
strategies and the pricing rule remain the same. The trading volume and
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price levels are different because the volatility of the equilibrium
trading volumes are different. The following lemma summarizes the
results for the dual trading case.
Lemma 4: Suppose dual trading is permitted and the broker charges a fee
of Cj per trade. An equilibrium exists if (A41) in the appendix is
satisfied. Further, when x^ > 0, at least two informed traders must
trade. In equilibrium, the i-th informed trader trades x =
^h^^ ^^
E(N |s-l) > where A. is defined in (3), and otherwise. The j-th
uninformed trader trades u = Djw-' if her utility from trading 6 > 6,
her reservation utility, and is otherwise. D^ is defined in (A40) of
the appendix. The broker trades d = B^x^ -
-^ whenever x^ > and/or
Uj > and otherwise. B^ = 1/(Q-1). The price level p^ = r^y^
whenever y^ > 0, where:
TdDd 3
\/ititVd" 1 (18)
I u
Denote T and T as the no-trading intervals of the informed and
d d
uninformed traders, respectively. Then:
Tj = [-ai, -an where a,^ = ^ -^ /^ (19)
Td" = [-ad"/ +ad''] where ad"" =
ab(Da) N Td^RZd
(20)
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where Z. is defined in (A39) of the appendix. Thus dual trading affects
the probability of a customer trade, whether informed or informed.
V. THE EFFECT OF DUAL TRADING ON COMMISSION FEES
Suppose that the broker faces a fixed cost Jcq and a variable
cost k^ of conducting business, both costs being non-negative. To be
consistent with the representation of the commission fee, it is assumed
that k, is incurred on a per trade basis. Thus, the broker's total
variable costs in market i equals k^ times the expected number of
informed and uninformed trades in market i. Following Fishraan and
Longstaff (1992), I assume that the brokerage business is competitive
and so the commission fee c- is chosen so that the broker's expected
trading profits n plus her expected commission income equals zero. Then
the broker's commission fees with and without dual trading must satisfy:
ko - n = 2(c^-k,) [m<I>(-ad') +h<I>(-ad")
]
(21)
ko = 2(c„-ki) [m<I»(-a„') +h<I>(-an") ]. <22)
In (21), the broker's fixed cost kg equals her trading profits
plus the net profit margin per trade (c^-k^) times the expected number
of customer trades. ' For each group of customers, informed and
uninformed, the expected number of trades equals the number of traders
(m and h) times the probability of a trade. The probability of a trade
for a particular trader group is calculated as twice the value of the
normal distribution at the lower end point of the no-trade interval for
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that group. Equation (22) has a similar interpretation, except that the
broker has no trading profits by hypothesis.
Equations (21) and (22) define c^^ and c^^ implicitly. An explicit
solution for the equilibrium commission fees is not possible. ^^
Instead, I will establish sufficient conditions such that (c^-c ) can be
signed. If the expected number of customer trades is the same or
greater with dual trading then clearly c . < c^, as in Fishman and
Longstaff (1992). However, if the expected number of customer trades is
lower with dual trading, Jcq is large (the precise condition is in the
appendix) and dual trading profits are small in magnitude, then c. > c
is possible. The dual trading profits are:
-D,
71 = ^ y;;;^^^^^. (23)
simulation results show that the RHS of (23) is decreasing in m
w
and increasing in h and V . Thus dual trading profits will tend to be
d
small when there are many informed traders and relatively few uninformed
traders who do not trade aggressively. The broker may then be able to
offset the loss of her trading profits when dual trading is banned
through higher commission income generated by the greater number of
customer trades and thus maintain lower commission fees c^. By
combining (21) and (22), the following relation obtains:
2(m+h) [c„(<I>(-an') +<I»(-a„") ) - c^(^{-a^) *<l>(-a^) )]
= 71 * 2k,[m(*(-an') -^(-aj) ) * h(*(-a„") -^(-a^) )].
(24)
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(24) is in the nature of an accounting relation which says that
the difference in expected commission costs of all customers between the
two markets (the LHS of the equation) is equal to the dual trading
profits plus the difference in the expected variable costs incurred by
the broker. Thus, if the probability of a customer trade is lower with
dual trading then expected commission costs of all customers are also
lower. Note that this holds even if c. > c„.d n
Proposition 5: (1) c^ < c if the probability of all trades is the same
or higher with dual trading. (2) If the probability of all trades is
lower with dual trading, the broker's fixed costs kp are large and the
magnitude of dual trading profits is small, c^ > c^ is possible.
However, when the probability of all trades is lower with dual trading
the expected commission costs of all traders is also lower with dual
trading.
An alternative characterization of the sign of (c^'Cf^) in terms of
just the probability of informed trading and the change in the market
depth parameter is given below.
Corollary 4: Assume that there exist solutions c^ and c^ to (21) and
(22). c^ < c^ if the probability of an informed trade is higher with
dual trading and the market depth is never higher, i.e., F^ > F^.
c^ > c^ if the probability of an informed trade is lower and market
depth is sufficiently higher with dual trading, specifically
QFj < (Q-1)F„.
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The expected net trading profits of all informed traders in
market i is denoted by N-. These are equal to I-, the expected gross
profits (conditional on trading) minus the expected commission costs:
mtv7
" r„(l+Q)2 n \ n;
mtV,
^
_rn v Q^ _ ^^^^/ u) (26)
Expected gross profits I- (the first terms on the RHS of the two
equations) are calculated with respect to the truncated distributions of
x- . Expected commission costs are equal to the commission fees c-
times m, the number of informed traders times the probability of an
informed trade in the i-th market. Without commission fees, I . < I„.
' d n
Here:
"^^^g"'^
^^^N^-D^^fC^ (27)
Thus I^ > I^ is possible if ah(D^) fjjv^ > 2slV^ab{Dj, i.e., the
product of the asset volatility and uninformed trading volatility is
twice as high with dual trading and, further, the amount of
information mt is large (making the ratio (Q-l)/Q closer to 1). For
1^ < 1^, it is sufficient that the product of the volatilities is lower
with dual trading. Combining (24), (25) and (26) gives:
where
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-2k4m(*(-a„') -*(-a</) )+h(*(-an^) -^(-a^) )]
The difference in net profits of the informed depends upon the
difference between gross profits of all informed traders (including the
broker), the difference in commission costs paid by the uninformed and,
finally, the change in the broker's variable costs. For the uninformed
traders, the appendix shows that:
2
E(G„) - E(G<i) = I^ - (Id + 71) + Rh
+ 2h[c^«K-ad") -c„<I>(-a„^) ].
Zn-^^^- Zd(Dd)^
(30)
In words, the difference in the expected utilities of the
uninformed between the two markets depends upon the difference in
expected gross profits of the informed (including that of the dual
trader), the difference in the expected volatility of uninformed trading
profits and the relative commission costs. The following proposition
summarizes the results on the gross and net profits (utilities) of
informed (uninformed) traders.
Proposition 6 . Suppose V^ < V^, v" < v" and (V^VJ > (V^v") . Thendndn ad nn
(1) Ijj < Ip and ( Ij-Hr) < I^. Further, the utilities (gross of commission
fees) of the uninformed traders are also lower with dual trading.
(2) N^ < N if, in addition, the expected commission costs of the
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uninformed traders are lower and the broker's total variable costs are
higher with dual trading. (3) E(G^) < E:(Gp) with the further condition
that the expected commission costs of the uninformed traders are higher
with dual trading.
Except for the inequality relating I^ and I^, all other
inequalities are reversed if the signs on the sufficient conditions are
reversed as well. Proposition 6 suggests that for the informed traders
to be worse off with dual trading, two things must happen. First,
uninformed traders pay relatively less in commission costs with dual
trading. Second, the probability of an informed trade must increase
less than the probability of an uninformed trade with dual trading.
This is because, from Result 1, for a random variable r the volatility
v'" is increasing in the size of the no-trade interval.
For the uninformed traders, those conditions which are sufficient
to ensure that 1^ + n exceed (fall short of) I^ are also sufficient to
ensure that the expected volatility of uninformed trading profits is
higher (lower) with dual trading. thus, dual trading changes the gross
utilities of the uninformed traders in the same direction as the gross
profits of all the other traders in the market. It is easy to show,
however, that the net utilities are more likely to increase with dual
trading if the relative commission costs of the informed traders
increase.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper considers the effects of allowing brokers to trade on
their own account (to dual trade) in addition to their usual
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intermediary function. In the model without commission fees, dual
trading leads to a reduction in total trading volumes and market depth,
but price efficiency is not affected. The dual trading activity comes
at the expense of both informed and uninformed traders who are the
broker's customers. Informed traders are hurt because they are forced
to be less aggressive in anticipation of the broker mimicking their
trades and "piggybacking" on their information. The broker also takes
the opposite position of uninformed trades and offsets a portion of
uninformed trading. However, the price impact of an uninformed trade
and the variance of uninformed profits are unchanged and so, on balance,
uninformed traders neither gain nor lose with dual trading.
The model is extended to include fixed (i.e., independent of the
order size) commission fees which traders must pay to the broker if they
choose to trade. Now, traders sometimes choose not to trade if their
expected profits are less than the commission fee. The effect of dual
trading depends upon the changes in the probabilities of informed and
uninformed trades. Commission fees may be higher with dual trading if
the probability of a customer trade decreases and the size of dual
trading profits is small. However, the expected commission costs of all
traders are also lower with dual trading when the probability of a
customer trade is lower.
Ignoring commission fees, informed gross profits are lower and
expected utilities of the uninformed are the same with dual trading.
With commission fees, when the uninformed traders pay relatively lower
commission costs with dual trading and the probability of their trading
increases relative to that of the informed traders then informed traders
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net profits are lower. For the uninformed traders their utilities gross
of commission fees increase when the gross profits of all other traders
increase as well. Their net utilities will increase with dual trading
if, in addition, their relative commission costs are lower with dual
trading.
H-AS. 13-43
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FOOTNOTES
^See The Chicago Tribune , February 4, 1992 and The Wall Street
Journal , February 1, 1992 for details.
^Later, the basic model is extended to allow for rational behavior
by uninformed traders.
^The broker is assumed to have no private information of her own.
For a model with a privately informed broker, see Sarkar (1991).
The assumption of a batch market maximizes the negative impact of
piggybacking on informed trading. But the effect would remain in a
setting where the orders of the customers and the broker are executed
(and priced) separately, so long as some subset of the informed
customers make repeat purchases or sales via the same broker. From Kyle
(1985), the optimal dynamic trading strategy of an informed trader is in
fact to dribble her trades over time.
^By virtue of being able to infer the information of her informed
customers, the broker can be considered to be a de facto informed
trader.
°I will adopt the convention of labelling the decision variables of
individual agents with a superscript and market variables with a
subscript. The subscript d will refer to the solution in the dual
trading model and the subscript n to the nondual trading solution.
The broker is assumed to have no independent information
regarding v. In a previous version of this paper (Sarkar (1991)), the
broker has her own information but does not observe uninformed trades u.
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Also m = 1. This makes for some interesting interactions between the
information of the single insider and that of the broker. For example,
for low precision of the broker's information, the insider's trades is
actually decreasing in the precision of her own information!
°For m = 2, I have checked that the results are unchanged if the
informed traders have information of different precisions. I conjecture
that this is true for general m.
"in Sarkar (1991), an equilibrium exists even with m = 1 so long as
the precision of the broker's information is positive. The reason is
that, if the broker has an independent source of information about v,
she attaches relatively less weight to her observation of the informed
trade. The change in the broker's inference, when the informed trader
buys or sells an extra share, no longer fully offsets the marginal value
of that extra share traded.
^^Since, in the model so far, the trading volume of the uninformed
is not a choice variable, the impact of dual trading on uninformed
trading volume will not be considered until Section III (when I do model
the uninformed trading decision)
.
This interpretation of a nondual trading market as one where the
broker does not trade at all appears to be consistent with market
realities (for example, the S&P 500 index futures market where such a
ban is currently effective) . In the previous version of this paper
(Sarkar (1991)) the broker was assumed to be independently informed and
this raised troubling issues as to what happens to the broker's
information when dual trading is banned.
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A related issue concerns the choice of brokers. Some brokers can
commit not to dual trade (as occurs in reality). Those customers who
value the superior trading skills of dual trading brokers (as suggested
in Grossman (1989)) will continue to patronize them. Others, perhaps
more concerned with frontrunning and other potential abuses, may choose
the brokers committed not to dual tradQ. Thus, my model should be seen
as a reduced form of this more general situation where traders and
brokers are matched according to their varying needs. I thank the
Editor, Douglas W. Diamond, for bringing these points to my attention.
1?
'Of course, the actual informed and dual trading volumes will be
different since market depth will be different, in general.
^The "hedge factor" is different from the hedge ratio familiar in
the futures/options literature since, here, the asset being used for
hedging purposes is the same one that is being hedged.
^^Note that this is precisely the situation considered in the
previous section, where u was exogenously fixed at the same level in the
two markets. The appendix proves this result formally.
1S
"^I wish to thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out to
me.
°The best source for these results is Johnson and Kotz (1970).
Given the equilibrium relationships between informed trades and
the information signals, and uninformed trades and the endowments, the
truncated distributions of x and u imply (in equilibrium) truncated
distributions for v, s-" and w' as well. It is sometimes more intuitive
to express the results in terms of these exogenous variables rather than
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the endogenous trading variables. Notice also that since the no-trade
intervals are specific to each market i, so are these variances.
^^Define t^ = (V /V ) as the information precision defined with
n n n
^
respect to the truncated distribution. Since the no-trade interval is
the same for each informed trader, the information precision defined
with respect to the untruncated distribution t = t^.
The broker also derives commission income from her own trades
but, since this is also a cost to the broker for the same amount, it
balances out in the broker's account.
^°The reason is that the normal distributions must be evaluated at
the lower end point of the no-trade intervals of the traders. These
no-trade intervals depend upon the market depth which, in turn, depend
upon the variances of v and w defined with respect to their truncated
distributions. From Result 1, however, the variances themselves are
functions of the normal distributions. This circularity prevents an
explicit expression of the equilibrium commission fees.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
m
Let E(v|s^ , . . . , s"" ) = as , where s* = J^s^*. Applying Bayes'
i-l
^^^^' ^ = l/S^^^^/S, = lMm'-l)t - "^^^^ ^ = V(V^e)- This gives the
optimal dual trade d(s ,x^) as given in (1).
Incorporating (1), each informed trader i's profits I can be
d
written as:
T^ - Iv - t s* _
r. I'd^ Li (Al)
^ 1'' i-(m-i)t -J- T""^
-^
n
X ^
Substituting s^* = s^ = —— for each i = l,...,m into (Al)
Ad
E(ldNs^) = ts^-i^fr. . ^ 1
2 "* l+(m-l) t A.
_^
E(xi|si) /
^ t aV
j4l 2 ^ ^ l+(m-l)t aJ
(A2)
Xd^
Jl^ix -Substituting E(x
|
s^ ) = A.ts' for each } * L into (A2) and then
differentiating with respect to x gives (2). When m = 1, (2) has the
d
form:
xi(^.rj = tsi (A3)
It is easily checked that there is no A . > such that x = A.s^ has a
solution.
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Proof of Proposition 1
^ .. ^
Xd[l+t(m-l)] uFrom (3) and (5), y<j = Xd+d + u=
^^^_^^
+
^ ,
or:
Yd =
ts
[2+t(m-l)] r. 2
1
"*
-=- + ^, where s = Y,^^
1-1
(A4)
(6) follows from solving r^ = covariance (v^y^) /variance (y^)
Proof of Corollary 1
From (3), (5) and (6), ab(d) = ab Ignoring terms
independent of m and t, ^^^^^^ = 1 b (m 1) ^^(3) > q for t(m-l) < 1
fit AQ^y/mt
B^ > 1, from (1)
.
or
Proof of Corollary 2
m
Define Q(m) = 1 + t(m-l), Q(m+1) = 1 + tm, s (m) = J^ s ^ and
i-l
m*l
s (m+1) = J^s^. Notice that Q(m+1) > Q(m) . Then:
i"i
Ad = ab(d(m+1)) -ab{d(m))
1 1
2^ /Tkh 0(m+l) ab(s (m+l) )
-
-^
,/S 0(rn)
ab (s (m)
If s(m) > 0, then
Ad =
yiTS Q(m+1) ys Q(m)
s(m)
2 ^ v^snr Q(m+1)
< if s""*^ <
> if s"*^ > ks(m)
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where k = ^^^^ • -^liL^
.
If s(m) < 0, then
1
/ITS Q(l+m) ^ Q(m)
ab(s (m) )
_/tSu
^
1
. 1
2 /S; n/ThS 0(1 +rn)
< if s""*^ >
If s"**'' < 0, then Ad > if ab(s'^"') > kab(s(tn)), where k is
defined earlier.
Proof of Lemma 2
Each informed trader "i" chooses x to maximize E(I Is'), where:
n n
3*1
i,^ = v-rx-r„j:x,^ x.^ (A5)
The first-order condition for x yields;
n
Xn' = -||^[l-(m-l)r,A„] (A6)
Solving (A6) yields the equilibrium value for A^^. Solving for r^ in the
usual way, (7) is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2
Price informativeness PI,-,i = d,n is defined as:
Pli = Sv - Variance (v|p.) = PfSy.. (AV)
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Since r^ = 2r^ but y^ = ^, PI^ = PI^.
I| = E([v-p-]x-) is the total unconditional expected profits of
the informed traders in market i = d,n. I^ < I^ since p. = p and
^d < ^n-
Id + t: = E( [v-pj] [Xd+d])
= e{[v-pj[^-|]} = I r s
(A8)
_ _ i/mtSvSu
The result follows because T^J:,, = -^ = I„
,
n u
-J.+0
^
Proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 3
Consider the nondual market first. The profits of the j-th
hedger
:
(A9)
tsFrom the maximization problem of the informed traders, r„x„ =c ' n n 1+Q
Substituting for r x in (A9) and taking expectations:
3 \2E(4|w^) = -r„(u„^) (AlO)
Var(7i^|wJ) = E vw ts
''^-r'Tfe-^-'^'^S^wj / .
3\2
= S,(wJ)2 ^(u,^) Sv(i-^^i^^)Mr,Dj^(h-i)s,
+ 2S„u„^w3 All^
1+Q'v"^n
(All)
(AlO) and (All) together define G"" . Differentiating G"" with respect to
n
-2r„u^^ - Ru^^ y I T mt (Q+2) + (r,DjMh-i)s„
1+0
Ecjuating D^ with the coefficient of w^ in (A12) gives:
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(A12)
R(DjMr,)Mh-l)S, +D,
+ RS^ SAi^ = .
^ Q + l
2r, + RS, \ _ mt(Q+2)
(Q+l)' (A13)
Solving for r^, I get equation (11) in the text. It follows from
equation (11) that since r^ > to satisfy the second-order condition
for the informed traders, D^ < in equilibrium. Substituting for T^D^
in (A13) and solving for D :
^
2ymti:v/(hS^ ) -RS^(2-t)
(A14)
Since D^ < 0, equilibrium exists if
RS^(2-t) > y (A15)
The denominator of D^ in (A14) is always positive, so (A15) is
sufficient for D„ < 0. To show this, rewrite the denominator as:
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Den = RS, _ mt(Q-t-2)
(Q+l)2
^
(h-l)mt
h(Q+l)2
RS,
> 0.
In the second step, the definition Q = 1 + t(m-l) has been used.
Now, consider the dual trading market.
Ttd = v(ui +w^) - Tdui ts j (A16)
Proceeding in the usual way.
E(itd|w^) = -^ (ui)?\2 (A17)
Var(7i^|wi) = S^(wJ)2 + (u^) 2 L mt(2+Q) '
'I (1*0)^ J
(r^D,)^
:h-i)s.
(A18)
+ 2S^w3Ud'j (2-t)
1+Q
r.D. = -2
•d^d
v^int/s;; (A19)
(1+0) /hs;
From (11) and {A19), r^D^ = 2r^D^. Solving For D^ proves D^ = D^.
From these results, E(7r Iw-i) = E(7r Iw-') and Var(7r Iw-") = Var(7r Iw-") and so
d n d n
J JG. = G for each j. Thus G. = G„. Finally, D. = D„ implies r. = 2r„ fromdn dn -''dn'^ an
(11) and (A19>^
Proof of Proposition 4
E(Nn^|s^) = ts^-r„x„^-r„J2E(XnMs^) -r,J^E(Un'|s
l*] 1-1
Xn - C^
where
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(A20)
E(Xn^|s^) = tA„S^ + (l-t)Mn'' (A21)
E(unMsJ) =h: (A22)
X . u
t = 2„/S_ and M , M are the truncated means defined in Result 1 (putting
r = X , u . Note that, since var(s-') = E , j=l,...,m and var(w') = 2 ,
n n ^ ••
X u
i=l,...,h, M and M are the same for each informed and uninformed trader
n n
in the nondual trading market).
Incorporating (A21) and {A22) into (A20) and differentiating with
respect to x gives the following first-order condition:
n
2r„Xn^ = ts^ - (m-l)r„[tA^s^ + (l-t)M„^] - hT^Mn^, (A23)
Using (A23), the condition E(N s-") > simplifies to:
n
Ki^.)' > c,, (A24)
So, from Result 1, M^ = 0. For the j-th uninformed trader:
E(4|w^) = -r„(u„^)2 - (h-i)r,M"Un^ - mr„M-Un^ - C„
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Var(4|w^) = Sv(wJ)2 + (u^^) mt'
(l+Q)^
^
m(m-l) t^
v'' -
^"'^
v''
(1+Q) 2 " l+Q
"" + 2u>^S^
V s w
where V , V and V are the truncated variances defined in Result 1,
n n n
putting r = V, s-" and w^ . The optimal uninformed trade solves the
following equation:
-2r„UH' - (h-l)r„M'^ - mr„M^ - Ruri'Z^ - Rw^S^ = (A25)
where
Z„ = L, ^ (h-1) (r^Dj^V,^ + _rntl^ v^« ^ ""^"^-^^^' V„^ - 2mt ^v
(l+Q) (l+Q) 2 ^ l+Q '^
(A26)
— RThe reservation utility G = - — Ii^(w^)^ . Using (A25), the gains from
trade GT_ = G - G are:
u
GTn = -^ [-2r^Un' - 2(h-l)r„M" - 2mr„M'' - RZ^u^" - 2Rw3S^] - c„
(A27)
= (u„^)^ r + —
z
Thus, the condition GT^ > requires:
u.-' > ± JSl
I
r + —
z
" 2 ^
(A28)
Again, from Result 1, m" = 0.
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A sufficient condition for the denominator in (A28) to be positive
V < V
is that Z_ > 0. When V = Z , this is always the case. Since V > 2
,
'' n '' n *
however, it is possible that Z^ < 0. Rewrite Z as follows (using the
fact that t = t„ = V^/V^:
n n n
(1+0)^ h
Then Z^ > provided:
S„(1*Q) >mtv:. j^^^^^j
^^"^^ (A30)
Comparing with (A33) below, this is precisely one of the conditions
needed for D^ < in equilibrium. So, whenever equilibrium exists.
Z„ > must hold.
n
Putting M^ = and m" = in (A23) and solving, I get x^ = A^sJ
when E(N Is-") > 0, where A is defined in (7). Next, solve for r :
r = _
"^"^"
m(Aj2v„" + m(m-l) (Aj ^y^" + hlDj^v^'
or
D^r„ = - —V^^X^ . (A31)
Substituting M^ = and M" = in (A25) and solving for D^, I get
a cubic equation in D . After substituting for r^D^ from (A31):
Dn =
48
^^^ + RV>t - RS,(1+Q)
\/h\C (A32)
« , . V RVJ'mt
For equilibrium to exist, we need r^ > and D^ < 0. To maintain
consistency with the no commission fee case, I require the denominator
of D to be positive and the numerator to be negative. The twin
conditions are:
Z^ > (A33)
and
I u
To derive the no-trade intervals T and T , note that {A24) can be
n n
rewritten in the following way by using the definition of A from (7):
(ts^)2 > (l+Q)2c„r„. (A35)
Thus, trade occurs if ab(s-') < a , where a is defined in (16).
n n
For the uninformed traders, since u = D w , trade occurs if
n '' n
(using (A27) )
:
(D w:)2 > —^ (A36)
2r„ ^ RZ„
i
u u
or ab(w-') > a , where a is defined in (17).
n n
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Proof of Lemma 4
r
In equilibrium, E(Nd^|s^) = (Xd^)^—3- - c^. Thus, the j-th informed
trader trades provided:
ab(s^) > 1 .i^d . /QEI
Ad V^ V Q (A37)
using the definition of A. from (3).
For the j-th uninformed trader, the gains from trade;
(Gd* -G) = (ui)Mrd*RZj - Cd (A38)
where
Zd = s,
_mtVd^
(1+Q)'
+ 1 +Q (A39
The j-th uninformed trader trades if:
ab(w^) >
ab(Dd) ^RZ.
where
^ RS^(1+Q) + RV^mt
D^ = sML
RS^(l+Q) - RVd'^mt -
RV^mt
h(l+Q)
(A40)
For Dd < 0, it is sufficient that Zj > and RyintV^Vj > y/E il+Q) . ^^^^)
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Consider the broker's problem. If x^^ > and u^ > 0, then she
trades d = —-;
—
^—-r- -
-;^ . Further, from Proposition 1, there must be att(m-l; 2
least two informed trades when x^ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
(1) Let *(i) =m*(-ai^) * h^i-at) . , i=d,n be the probability of
all trades in market i. By hypothesis, * (d) ^ $ (n) . Rewrite (21) and
(22) as:
Cn=K ^ 2*(n)
^^ =
^^
' 2TOr "
Since TT > 0, Cj < c_.
n
^ _ ^0 / 1 1 \
(2) c, -c„ - ^(^7^ - -^j^) -n
> if ko > i^^^^^l;^,^^, and *(n) > * (d) .
" * (n) - * (d)
II u u
From (24), if a > a and a > a , then the RHS of the equation is
d n d n
positive. Thus, the difference in expected commission costs of all
traders between the nondual and dual trading market (the LHS of (24)) is
positive.
Proof of Corollary 4
By hypothesis, a . < a , or:
d n
1+Q ^/Q /—p- . 1+Q rrY'
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Since
,^ , > 1 and r. > r„, c. < c„ or there is a contradiction.[Q — X
)
d n' a n If
a > a , but Qr. < (Q-l)r„, we must have c. > c„ to avoid a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6
From the definition of Z-, ab(D-) can be written as:
RSv(i+Q)
ab(Di)
RVi^'mt
RZi(l+0)
(A42)
Differentiate (A42) with respect to V. and consider the numerator of
this derivative:
RZid+O) ( Rmth(l+Q)
V^Tlt
/hWV?J
+ Rmt
( h(l+Q) ^^)
RV^mt
h(l+Q)
> because Z- > and (A34) and (A41) hold in equilibrium. Thus,
V V w
ab(D-) is increasing in V.. Clearly it is also decreasing in (V./V.)
V , w V , M
So, ab(D.) < ab(D„) if V < V and (V /V ) > (V /V ) . If, in addition,
" '' dn dd nn
V^ < V then I. < I„. Further, (l^+n) < 1 from (29).
d n an ' * d ' n ' '
Using (A27) and (A38)
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r + —-
2
- 2c,*(-a„")hEiGj - E(Gd) = hE(Un^)2
^
_
D^yv>„"VmtH ^ Dd^/Vd'VcTVmtE ^ hRZ„(D„)^
1+0 1 +Q 2
- hRZd(Dd)2 + 2h[*(-ad^)Cd - *(-an")cJ .
(A43)
The second equality is derived from the first by observing that
u. = D-w-i, i=d,n and by substituting in the value of -(T-D) from
equations (15) and (18) in the text. From (29) in the text:
E(GJ - E(GJ = I, \l^ + n) + Rh Zn(Dj - Zd(Dd)
+ 2h[c^<l>{-a^) - c„<I>(-a„")]
(A44)
which is equation (30) in the text.
From before, (I^+tt) < I„ if V^ < V^, v" < v" and (V^VJ > (V^v")
o ' dndn dd nn
It remains to show that these conditions also ensure that:
hRZ„(D„)2 ^ , _V-^ - hRZd(Dj2 >
I will refer to the numerator of ab(D-) in (A42) as (Num.). Then,
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,
-J , , , , .V (Nurti;
)
hRZi(Di)2 = h(ab(Di)) •
^ ^^ ^ 1 1+Q
^ h (Num^)^
R Zi
by repeated use of the definition of ab(D.) (from (A44)). The
Vderivative of this last expression with respect to V. is:
R(Zi)
2Zj^ (Num^^] Rmt - 42
V^ivTv?
+ (Num^) mtmt
1+Q h(l+Q)
> since Z. > and Rmt > i/mt
-V ,. H
v^ivTv?
from (A34) . Further, (Num.) is
decreasing in (V./V.). Thus, under the given conditions, ignoring the
1 1
commission fees E(G^) > E(Gj). This proves part (1) of the proposition.
Given our results from part (1), parts (2) and (3) follow directly
from equations (28) and (30) in the text.



